Environmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? by Morgenstern, Richard




Resources for the Future
1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC  20036
Telephone 202-328-5000
Fax 202-939-3460
© 1995 Resources for the Future.  All rights reserved.
No portion of this paper may be reproduced without
permission of the author.
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their
authors for purposes of information and discussion.  They
have not undergone formal peer review or the editorial
treatment accorded RFF books and other publications.-ii-
Environmental Taxes: Dead or Alive?
Richard D. Morgenstern
Abstract
Both theory and recent trends suggest some optimism for the future of environment-
related taxes.  While new research emphasizes the potentially significant distortions created by
environmental taxes and appears to undermine the so-called "double dividend" theory, it also
suggests that virtually any environmental policy, including regulations, taxes, and tradable
permits, can compound existing distortions in the tax system.  Currently, direct environmental
taxes, such as per-unit charges on emissions, are only in limited use; however, indirect
environmental levies, including taxes on fuels, vehicles, beverage containers, and fertilizers, are
growing in importance across the OECD nations.  Over the period 1990-1993, environmental
taxes as a share of total revenue increased while taxes on personal and corporate income
declined slightly, indicating a modest tax shift.
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With budget deficits looming in governments throughout the industrial world, the need to
develop sound and politically acceptable tax policies has never been more pressing.  In 1993, the
Clinton Administration's proposed BTU tax crashed like a lead balloon.  Yet, despite this
inauspicious debut, many analysts and even some politicians are becoming convinced that taxing
"bads," such as pollution, makes much more sense than continuing to tax "goods" (work,
savings, investment).  This idea was given impetus by the finding, supported by a number of
prominent experts including Pearce, Repetto et al., and others, that such tax shifting might yield
environmental gains at little or no cost, the so-called "double dividend" (Pearce, 1991, pp. 938-
948; Repetto et al., 1992).  The prospect of a zero-cost environmental policy is appealing on
many grounds, not the least of which is that it reduces the need for rationalizing information on
the relative benefits of any proposed policy.  Now new research by Bovenberg, Goulder, Parry,
and others is threatening to undermine this budding romance with environmental taxes
(Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Goulder, 1995; Parry, 1994).  In its simplest form, the new
literature -- which stresses the inefficiencies caused by the compounding effect of environmental
taxes on top of an already distorting tax system -- undercuts the "free lunch" argument.  That, in
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turn, may diminish the impetus to adopt environmental taxes.
Although not the favorite of policymakers, environmental taxes have rested on an
academic pedestal since first proposed by Arthur Pigou in his Economics of Welfare (1920).
Pigou argued that taxing emissions would reduce pollution in the most efficient manner
possible.  The idea that such taxes themselves would introduce new distortions into the
economy was never seriously considered by Pigou or by anyone else writing in the field for
almost three quarters of a century.  To the surprise of most economists the new research
concludes that the distortions associated with environmental taxes can be quite significant.  As
it turns out, other policy instruments, e.g., traditional regulations or tradable permits, cause
similar distortions.  However, unique among the other instruments currently in use,
environmental taxes provide the revenues which can be used to reduce other
(nonenvironmental) taxes and thereby reduce some of the distortions.  The real implication of
the new research is that while all policy instruments may be somewhat more costly than
previously thought, alone among instruments currently in use environmental taxes have the
potential to reduce some (probably not all) of those costs.
This article explores these new developments in the theory and examines recent
experiences in implementing environmental taxes in industrial countries.  The first section
reviews the recent and generally arcane economic literature, including much of the ongoing
debate of taxing "goods" and "bads."  It traces the evolution of academic writings on
environmental taxes from Pigou to those who contend that such taxes provide "double
dividends," to those who more recently argue that there can be no free lunch.  The second partEnvironmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -3-
analyses new information generated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on different country
practices with environmental taxes from 1990-1993.  The conclusion is that environmental
taxes -- whose share of total tax revenues rose by more than ten percent over the period 1990-
1993 -- remain an attractive policy instrument which are likely to be relied upon increasingly to
help ease fiscal pressures.
I.  THE  ACADEMIC  LITERATURE  ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  TAXES
A.   From Pigou to the "Double Dividend"
In the "Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin observed that overgrazing
unrestricted commonlands was a metaphor for the exploitation of all the earth's land, air, and
water resources.  Because private and social costs diverged, private profit-maximizing
decisions were not socially efficient.  The cause of the overgrazing was the absence of a
mechanism to force herdsmen to take into account the harmful effects of their own herds'
grazing on other herdsmen.  Similarly, the causes of pollution stem from the failure of markets
to incorporate the full costs or benefits of economic activities.  Government intervention in one
form or another, including taxes, can often lead to more socially desirable outcomes.
Economists have long advocated an emissions tax levied on each unit of pollution that
is discharged, where the tax is set equal to the value of the pollution damages, as a suitable
means of equating private and social cost.  By raising the price of polluting to reflect social
cost, environmental taxes ensure that polluters face both the private and the social costs of
their actions.  In the absence of taxes or other control mechanisms, for example, traditional-4- Morgenstern
regulations or marketable permits, environmentally damaging activities tend to be carried to
excess.  The fact that environmental taxes rely on a price mechanism rather than the
administrative prices associated with command-and-control regulations increases their
efficiency and lowers overall compliance costs.  They also encourage the greatest pollution
abatement by firms able to adjust at the lowest cost and they encourage deployment of new
technologies.
In truth, virtually all taxes create incentives or, more precisely, disincentives which have
the effect of re-allocating activities away from their pre-tax activities.  A tax on any good or
service raises its cost to the buyer, thereby creating an added incentive to search for cheaper
alternatives.  Similarly, it lowers the net after-tax receipts to the seller, discouraging production
or sale of the good or service.  It is because of these tax-induced economic pressures to alter
behavior, e.g., the incentive to buy the untaxed and presumably less desirable goods and
services that would not have been purchased in the absence of the tax, that every $100 in
revenue collected typically makes individuals worse off by more than $100.  This effect is
referred to as a loss in economic welfare.  The larger the incentive effects of individual taxes,
the larger the welfare losses.
Estimates for the U.S. economy have found that the disincentives to work and invest
from our current tax system are considerable.  Table 1 displays estimates of the disincentive
effects of U.S. taxes on social security, individual income and investment income.  Since some
of these estimates were made before the tax cuts of the 1980s, which lowered marginal tax ratesEnvironmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -5-
Table 1.  ESTIMATES  OF  TAX-INDUCED  DISTORTIONS
          TAX RANGE AVERAGE  VALUE
Social Security Payroll $0.31 to $0.48 $0.40
Individual Income $0.40 to $0.60 $0.50
Investment Income $0.58 to $1.18 $0.88
Sources:
Summarized by Repetto, Robert, Roger C. Dower, Robin Jenckins, and Jacqueline Geoghegan, Green Fees, World
Resources Institute, Washington, D.C., 1992.
Original sources as follows:
Ballard, Charles L.  "Marginal Efficiency Cost Calculations for Different Types of Government Expenditure:  A
Review," paper presented at the Australian Conference in Applied General Equilibrium, Melbourne, Australia,
May 27 - 28, 1991.
Jorgenson, Dale and Kun-Young Yun.  "The Excess Burden of Taxation in the United States,"  Harvard Institute for
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA., November 1990.
Trostel, Philip A.  "Taxation in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Human Capital,"  Ph.D. Dissertation,
Department of Economics, Texas A & M University, 1991.
on many forms of income, the lower end of the ranges are probably more applicable today.
The median of estimates of the disincentive effect of the individual income tax is 0.5.  Thus,
substituting $100 billion of (ideal) non-distorting taxes for the current income tax is estimated
to yield an additional $50 billion in consumer welfare.  For taxes on social security and
investment income, the comparable estimates are $40 billion and $92 billion, respectively.  Like
taxes on labor and investment, environmental taxes have disincentive effects.  However, for the
per-unit emission taxes of the type advocated by Pigou, it would appear at first blush that the
only disincentive effects are to discourage pollution.
In the early 1990s, a number of economists argued that there would be a "double
dividend" associated with substituting environmental taxes for other, distorting taxes.  Not-6- Morgenstern
only would the former reduce pollution and thereby generate health, ecological and other
benefits, but when substituted for the latter they could eliminate the losses associated with the
distorting taxes.  Given the magnitude of the disincentive effects associated with our current
tax system, many believed the "dividend" could be sizable.  A 1992 study by Shackelton et al.
compared the results of four large models of the U.S. economy on the consequences of
mitigating carbon dioxide emissions by imposing carbon taxes while recycling the revenues in
various ways.  It concluded that "the costs of a carbon tax may be largely and perhaps even
fully offset by taking advantage of its efficiency value and using the revenues to cut existing
taxes that discourage capital formation or labor supply."
2
  This gave succor to those who
believed all along that taxing "bads," such as carbon, would be inherently beneficial, and,
indeed, yield a bonus, or "double dividend."
B.  The Critique of the "Double Dividend"
Just as physicists have continued to discover new elementary particles, economists
develop more complete understanding of the operation of the economic system.  Recent
research has found that the "double dividend" theory oversimplifies a number of key points.
3
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 Of course if the tradable permits were sold or auctioned off (like the Federal Communications Commission
does with new radio frequencies), there would be revenues equivalent to taxes.
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 The "double dividend" argument referred to throughout refers to what is technically referred to in the
literature as the "strong" version.  There is also a "weak" version of the double dividend theory which simply
states that returning tax revenues through tax cuts in distortionary taxes leads to cost savings relative to the
case where revenues are returned in a lump sum or equiproportional amount to everyone.  This claim is easily
defended on theoretical (and empirical) grounds and is of little policy interest.  Accordingly, it is not discussed
herein.Environmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -7-
Specifically, the proponents of the "double dividend" theory have assumed that the distortions
caused by existing (nonenvironmental) taxes which, as noted, are sizable, are only affected by
changes in tax laws and that they cannot be exacerbated by environmental policies.  The new
research disputes that point by demonstrating that environmental policies -- which include
regulations, tradable permits and taxes -- can increase the distortions caused by pre-existing
(nonenvironmental) taxes.
The following case illustrates how this might occur.  If an individual earns $10 per hour
in the absence of any taxes it would take exactly one hour of labor to earn enough to purchase
a new compact disc (CD) costing $10.  If marginal tax rates, including both income and social
security payments, are one third, then it would take an hour and a half of labor to purchase the
same CD.  Various studies have shown that many people, including second or third earners in a
family, individuals with young children, and others, may be discouraged from entering the labor
force or may work fewer hours as a result of these (high) marginal tax rates.  Thus, in this
example, taxes discourage work and reduce consumer welfare.
Now consider an environmental policy that reduces toxic emissions from the
manufacture of plastics and solvents used in the production of CDs.  Whether the policy is in the
form of a regulation, a tradable permit or a tax, the cost of producing the CD is likely to rise.  If
it rises by 2 percent, or 20 cents, it will take the same worker in the no-tax world an additional
72 seconds (2 percent of 60 minutes) of labor to earn enough to purchase the CD.  In the
presence of the (existing) marginal tax rates, assumed to be one third, the new environmental
policy will raise the required work time by 108 seconds (2 percent of 90 minutes).-8- Morgenstern
The new research has shown that the additional required work time to purchase a given
set of consumer products, 108 seconds in the hypothetical example, will further discourage
certain people from entering the labor force or working long hours and thereby further reduce
consumer welfare.  If a tax on toxic emissions from CDs is the policy of choice then the
revenues can be used to reduce other taxes.  Yet the new research suggests that these rebates
are unlikely to fully offset the distortions caused by the initial tax on CD emissions.  Of course,
if the environmental policy used to achieve the environmental objective is in the form of a
regulation or a tradable permit that is given away without cost to the polluter, then there is no
revenue available to offset any of the newly created distortions.  Thus, one clear conclusion of
this new research is that while the existing (nonenvironmental) taxes may add to society's costs
of making virtually any environmental gains, alone among the policy instruments environmental
taxes have the potential to offset at least some of these costs (Shackelton et al., 1995).
Short of having controlled experiments -- an unlikely prospect -- research in this area is
dependent on the use of large computer simulations of these complex effects.  Of course,
different experts have different models and the arguments get arcane very fast.
Notwithstanding these challenges, one of the new areas being explored is whether using
environmental taxes to reduce taxes on capital as opposed to taxes on labor may revive the
"double dividend" theory.  As shown in Table 1, taxes on capital have been estimated to be
more distorting than taxes on labor.  Thus, reducing taxes on capital is likely to more easily
offset the distortions created by any new environmental taxes.  However, while the jury is still
out, few experts believe the differences will be large enough to overturn the basic conclusion:Environmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -9-
while revenue neutral environmental tax swaps do not make environmental gains a free lunch,
they may substantially reduce the costs when compared to other policy mechanisms.
II.  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  OECD  COUNTRIES
Coincident with these raging academic debates, the IMF has recently completed a
survey of tax laws in 42 nations -- industrial and developing countries, and economies in
transition.  They found that Pigouvian taxes were used in one or more instances in ten of the
19 OECD countries surveyed (mostly on hazardous wastes and aircraft noise).  None was used
in the U.S. and none was used outside the OECD except in the economies in transition where
all four countries surveyed were found to use them.  However, as the authors note, "it is easy
to exaggerate the role of Pigouvian taxes because the rates rarely reflect environmental
damages and, particularly in economies in transition, there is reason to believe that actual
practices diverge sharply from legislated provisions" (McMorran and Nellor, 1994, page 8).
In contrast, indirect environmental taxes, including levies on fuels, energy, fertilizers,
and beverage containers are widely used.  The IMF found them in 20 of the 23 non OECD
nations and in all 19 of the OECD countries surveyed.  Unfortunately, definitional issues
abound once you depart from pure Pigouvian taxes, and it is difficult to know exactly when a
tax is properly labeled an environmental tax.  The IMF survey addressed the issue from a
strictly legal perspective.  However, they did not attempt to develop revenue estimates.
Fortunately, the OECD has attempted to develop consistent definitions for the purpose of
estimating revenues.  All revenue estimates presented below are for the period 1990-1993 and
are derived from published OECD sources.  1990 is chosen as the base year since the share of-10- Morgenstern
revenues from environment-related taxes began rising significantly in that year.
Certainly the largest source of environment-related taxes across all OECD countries are
those on automobile fuels (gasoline and diesel) and on vehicles themselves.  However, other
taxes are of growing importance.  As an example of different nations' use of environment-
related taxes it is useful to examine the experience of several of the Nordic countries which
have been generally aggressive in adopting such taxes.  Denmark has sixteen separately
reported taxes with environmental implications -- the most of any country -- while Norway
relies on environment-related taxes more heavily than any of its Northern European neighbors
for its revenues.  In 1993, 7.30 percent of Denmark's total tax revenues were derived from
environmental related taxes, up from 7.08 percent in 1990 (Table 2).  The composition of
these revenues changed somewhat over this period, with the introduction of a CO2 tax and an
increase in the tax on certain oil products offsetting decreases in duties on petrol, motor
vehicle registration, coal and electricity.  Over the period 1990-1993, environmental taxes in
Norway rose by more than one percentage point, from 9.40 to 10.75 percent of total tax
revenue.  Like Denmark, Norway introduced a CO2 tax in the early 1990s.  This accounted for
the bulk of the increase in revenue while most other taxes increased slightly or not at all as a
source of revenue during this period.
Table 3 presents the share of revenue derived from taxes with environmental
implications for 20 OECD countries for 1990 and 1993.  Overall, these revenues rose from
6.02 percent of the total in 1990 to 6.67 percent in 1993, an increase in tax share of more thanEnvironmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -11-
Table 2.  ENVIRONMENT-RELATED  TAXES  IN  DENMARK  AND  NORWAY
(as a percent of total tax revenue)
TAX 1990 1991 1992 1993
DENMARK
Duty on petrol
Motor vehicle registration duty
Sales on vehicle number plates
Duty on electricity
Duty on certain oil products
Duty on certain retail containers
Duty on gas
Duty on extraction/import of raw materials
Duty on disposable tableware
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Source:  OECD, Environmental Taxes in OECD Countries, Paris, 1995.-12- Morgenstern
ten percent.  Looking at the individual countries, the 1993 environment-related tax shares
range from a low of 3.24 percent (U.S.) to a high of 11.85 (Greece).  Of the twenty nations,
only Ireland, Italy, and New Zealand failed to register an increase over the period.  Of the
seventeen nations showing increases in environment tax shares, ten rose by more than one-half
a percentage point, a common measure of significance used by tax experts.  Thus by virtually
any measure, it is hard to escape the conclusion that environment-related taxes are rising and
are becoming an increasingly important part of the financing system of OECD nations.
Table 3.  ENVIRONMENTAL  TAXES  IN  20  OECD  COUNTRIES,  1990-1993
(as a percent of total tax revenues)
       COUNTRY 1990 1993 CHANGE
Austria 4.00 4.35 +0.35
Belgium 3.83 4.49 +0.66
Canada 2.87 3.44 +0.56
Denmark 7.08 7.30 +0.22
Finland 4.72 5.40 +0.68
France 4.88 4.92 +0.04
Germany 5.46 6.12 +0.66
Greece 7.43 11.85 +4.42
Ireland 10.35 8.98 -1.37
Italy 7.82 6.52 -1.30
Japan 5.11 5.49 +0.38
Netherlands 5.12 6.12 +1.00
New Zealand 5.08 4.76 -0.32
Norway 9.40 10.75 +1.35
Portugal 10.63 11.52 +0.89
Spain 5.82 7.54 +1.72
Sweden 5.77 6.34 +0.57
Switzerland 4.26 4.65 +0.38
United Kingdom 7.35 8.23 +0.88
United States 2.88 3.24 +0.36
Average (unweighted) 6.02 6.67 +0.65
Source:  Calculated from Revenue Statistics in OECD Member Countries, OECD, Paris, 1995.Environmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -13-
Table 4.  OVERALL  COMPOSITION  OF  TAX  STRUCTURE,  1990-1993
U.S. Other OECD Countries
1990 1993 Change 1990 1993 Change
Environmental taxes/
total revenues
2.88 3.24 +0.36 6.18 6.85 +0.67
Pers and Corp Income Taxes/
total revenues
43.16 42.37 -0.79 37.25 35.93 -1.32
Social security contributions/
total revenues
29.53 29.15 -0.38 27.06 28.62 +1.56
Consumption taxes/
total revenues
16.47 17.18 +0.71 30.19 29.86 -0.33
Total tax revenues/GDP 28.94 28.79 -0.15 40.13 41.90 +1.77
Source:   Calculated from Revenue Statistics in OECD Member Countries, OECD, Paris, 1995.
But is this growth in environmental taxes evidence of tax shifting?  Certainly a number
of countries have been quite explicit about substituting environmental levies for taxes on both
personal and corporate income.  A recent OECD report has noted that, particularly in Northern
Europe, "a shift in tax structure away from income taxation towards . . . indirect taxes
including environmental taxes is often seen as beneficial because it can help reduce structural
problems in the economy" (OECD, 1995, page 13).  But how about the countries outside of
Northern Europe?  Lines (1) and (2) of Table 4 present information on changes in
environment-related taxes as well as taxes on personal and corporate income for the U.S. and
other OECD countries over the 1990-1993 period.  While some of these tax ratios may vary
for cyclical reasons, the findings are clear: during the period 1990-1993, the share of tax
revenues derived from environmental taxes rose by a little more than 10 percent in the U.S.
and by a comparable percentage in other OECD countries.  Personal and corporate income-14- Morgenstern
taxes decreased as a share of total revenue in both the U.S. (about 2 percent) as well as in
other OECD countries (almost 4 percent).  Thus, despite the lack of elaborate political
announcements outside of Northern Europe, it appears that at least a small tax substitution of
environment-related taxes for individual and corporate income taxes is actually taking place
throughout the OECD.
Does this mean that OECD countries are embracing the double-dividend type theories
as a means of reducing tax distortions in their economies?  Probably not.  Recall that most of
the so-called environmental taxes are of the indirect rather than the Pigouvian type discussed
above.  Thus, they are less efficient means of abating pollution than Pigouvian taxes.  In
addition, consider the other tax shifts taking place simultaneous with the changing importance
of environment and income taxes (lines (3)-(5) of Table 4).  Outside the U.S., social security
taxes increased significantly.
4
  While this may be a reflection of the need to fund current
pension commitments, nonetheless, it reflects an increase in a type of taxation which is thought
to be quite distorting.  Similarly, taxes as a percent of GDP rose significantly in OECD
countries outside the U.S., indicating that despite the rhetoric, environmental tax increases may
be as much a part of an overall revenue raising strategy as they are an attempt to reduce tax
distortions.
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 Although the share of revenues derived from social security taxes declined slightly in the U.S. during the
period 1990-1993, the longer trend is for an increasing share.Environmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -15-
III.  CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions seem clear from this review:
1. The widely embraced "double dividend" theory, that a revenue-neutral tax shift may
yield environmental gains at virtually no cost, is not holding up to further analysis.
While there are significant environmental benefits associated with a tax shift -- which
may well exceed the costs for many policy choices -- these gains are not generally
costless: we'll need to do our homework to determine the benefits of new policies.
2. Whereas the new research in this field has been interpreted as undermining the
theoretical basis for taxes as an important environmental policy tool, nothing is further
from the truth.  Our present tax system creates significant disincentives for work,
saving and investment.  The new research shows that virtually any environmental
policy can compound these existing distortions.  Unlike regulations or tradable permits
(as currently administered), the revenues generated by environmental taxes can help
offset some of the distortions.  Thus, while each of the policy instruments has its
distinctive pros and cons, environmental taxes, even though they do not provide a free
lunch, are still relatively more efficient from an economic standpoint.
3. Although the ideal per unit taxes on emissions or discharges, so-called Pigouvian
taxes, are only in limited use, and not at all outside of Europe, indirect environment
levies, including taxes on fuels, vehicles, beverage containers, fertilizers, and others,
are growing in importance across the OECD nations.  Several Northern European
countries have even imposed small CO2 taxes.  Overall, environmental taxes as a-16- Morgenstern
share of total revenue have increased by more than ten percent over the period
1990-1993.
4. Taxes on personal and corporate income have declined over the same time period,
suggesting a modest tax shift.  However, this shift probably does not mean that
OECD nations are embracing the "double dividend" type theories as a means of
reducing tax distortions in their economies.  As noted, rises in social security taxes
and an increase in the overall rate of taxation cloud the picture.
 
Despite the mixed signals, both theoretical developments and recent trends suggest
some optimism for the future of environment-related taxes.  In democratic societies there is a
natural resistance to all taxes -- environmental or any other type.  Yet, with growing fiscal
pressures and rising demands for a cleaner environment, many countries are turning to
environmental taxes.  While the new research suggests that the cost of the cleaner environment
may be somewhat higher than previously thought, taxation still looks like the least cost way to
get there.Environmental Taxes: Dead or Alive? -17-
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